

NCRI-US Press Conference Exposes Quds Force's Proxy Naval Terror Units: Press Q & A

IRGC-QF's new game plan, training sites, weapon transfer, and recruitment process exposed, policy implications discussed.

WASHINGTON, DC, USA, February 14, 2022 /EINPresswire.com/ -- On Wednesday, February 2, 2022, the U.S. Representative Office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI-US) held a press conference in Washington, DC, to unveil detailed aspects of the proxy naval terror units and operations run by the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC-QF). The NCRI's representative in the United States, Ms. [Soona Samsami](#), opened the press conference and provided an overview of the new information and its policy implications for the U.S. and the world.



NCRI-US holds a press conference to expose the Quds Force's proxy naval terror units and to discuss its policy implications, February 2, 2022, Washington DC.

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Alireza Jafarzadeh, deputy director of the US office of the NCRI

[Alireza Jafarzadeh](#), the deputy director of the NCRI-US, followed by providing details of the NCRI's revelation using charts, graphs, satellite imagery, and other information about the new game plan of the IRGC-QF and the newly formed naval units consisting of foreign mercenaries, including the Houthis' (Ansarullah) from Yemen. Following his presentation, Mr. Jafarzadeh addressed questions from reporters attending the event in-person and remotely.


Below is the text of the Q&A segment of the press conference.

Q: I am just wondering how much money the [the Iranian regime] budgets for all these operations, because that is the people's money, and they are struggling economically and they are spending that much money there. I'm just wondering how

big that money is.

ALIREZA JAFARZADEH: That's a great question, because nothing is cheap, especially this level of operations by the Iran regime, bringing this large number of mercenaries into Iran, training them, arming them, amounts to a lot of money and resources. The priority for the Iranian regime has been and increasingly is to emphasize more and more on the Quds Force operations outside of Iran. Why? Because inside Iran they're in big trouble. They're facing large-scale protests by the Iranian population. There have been eight rounds of protests, uprisings nationwide across Iran since December 2017. There are ongoing protests as we speak right now, including the teachers in nearly 30 provinces all over the country. And workers are on strike. The inflation is extremely high. Prices are going up. But the regime is not spending any money and resources to resolve those issues. There's a lack of money, there's the whole issue of the environment and all of that. No money's really being spent there. Instead, they're putting all their attention on their military, especially the Quds Force. This year's budget, introduced by [Ebrahim Raisi](#), which is for the fiscal year that starts in March in a couple months, has the budget of the IRGC increase by 240%. The highest raise in the budget is for the IRGC, whereas everybody else practically their budget has decreased, taking inflation into consideration.

Why would the regime spend this much money there? Because that's the only hope that the regime has. They feel that the only way out of the crisis that they're facing, especially their crisis with their own population, the people of Iran, is to rely heavily on the Quds Force and spending money here and there, whether it's one day it's the drone program, the other day we talk about training their mercenaries in the region, the other day the missile program. These are very, very expensive projects that the Iranian regime is pursuing.




NCRI-US's deputy director Alireza Jafarzadeh responds to questions during a press conference on February 2, 2022, Washington DC, to expose Quds Force's Proxy Naval Terror Units.



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And also it explains why the Quds Force has really become the dominant force within the IRGC. When the IRGC was formed, in the beginning, there was no Quds Force. The Quds Force was formed in 1993. We were actually the first to announce and expose the formation of the Quds Force back then. And then over the years, of course, Quds Force became one of the four forces within the regime, in addition to the Navy, the Army, the Airspace Force, and then the Quds Force. Now in the past few years, the Quds Force is the dominant force within the Revolutionary Guards. That explains the stature of Qasem Soleimani, how dominant he was within the Revolutionary Guards, of course not just there but everywhere else. But also the amount of resources that the Supreme Leader allocates to the Quds Force.



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For instance, in these trainings that we talked about, the Quds Force is just bringing the regular Navy of the IRGC under its control. The commander of the IRGC Navy, Tangsiri, works under the control of Qaani when it comes to these facilities. Whatever the Quds Force needs in terms of bases, training, ships, speedboats, they give the priority to the Quds Force and they give the highest levels of training, equipment, speed boats, mines, missiles, to the Houthis in Yemen.

And that's why people shouldn't be surprised that a small group of individuals in Ansarullah, which was basically a creation of the Iranian regime, in that part of the world, how can they carry out these kind of terror operations? Well, it's not them. It's the state sponsor of terrorism. It's the Iranian regime behind it, behind everything from decision making to training to providing the equipment and the weapons, all of that. No missile is fired at Baghdad Airport, no missile is fired at the UAE facilities there, no bombs go off anywhere in that part of the world unless it's decided in Tehran. And it's part and parcel of the agenda of the Iranian regime. And I think that explains why the money goes here and not to the people of Iran, as you correctly said. The vast majority of the people of Iran live below the poverty line. Other questions? Yes, right here.

Q: Thanks so much. I'm Joe Clark with the Washington Times. I wanted to see can you speak a little bit more about the strategic threat to the Bab-el-Mendab? Do you see this is a major impact to the freedom of navigation potentially through that strait? And just talk, what is the goal? Is it more of a tactical threat or do you see a strategic risk with this?

ALIREZA JAFARZADEH: Well, of course the threat to the Bab al-Mandab, as you said, is a very serious threat, it's a strategic threat. Because that part of the world is key to much of the flow of

the shipping, the trade, everything basically goes through there. And so far, the Iranian regime has had very little influence or access there. And no one else in that part of the world would have been able to create such a threat, as they haven't in the past. And what explains this now is that the Iranian regime is using these proxies, especially the Houthi, the Ansarullah in Yemen, in making that play safe.

Now, the larger goal of the Iranian regime is not just the tactical thing. Their goal is to build nuclear weapons. Tehran's agenda since day one when it comes to their nuclear activities, is to build the nuclear bomb. The Iranian regime has never abandoned that goal to build a nuclear bomb. It's still pursuing that. In fact, since the past 15 months, when it became evident that there's going to be a new approach, new policy in the West regarding the Iranian regime's nuclear program, the Iranian regime has gotten a lot closer to building the bomb now than they have ever been. And they have used this situation.

So, whatever threats they are making in the region, not only it helps serve their purpose in the region, but also it helps the Iranian regime, they hope, in the absence of a decisive policy all of these actions would come to serve the Iranian regime saying, okay, this is the leverage we have; what can you give us at the negotiating table? But if there's a decisive policy that would hold the regime accountable for every act of terrorism they do, then this turns into a liability for the Iranian regime.

So, I think it all boils down to a very serious moment for the West to decide: Have they decided really or are they prepared to decide to prevent - truly - the Iranian regime from building the bomb, or they're just going to drag it? What does it mean to extend the breakout time for the nuclear program with the Iranian regime? Why do you want to extend it? You want to prevent the Iranian regime from building the bomb, period. So that's why these policies pursued in the past few years at the end of the day have left open the pathways to the bomb to the Iranian regime.

Not only that, but it has allowed the Iranian regime to evade, look at the past one year, the Iranian regime is able to evade sanctions and export more oil. They can get away with these terror operations. Not only that, but they can use them as leverage for the nuclear weapons program. And they're rapidly dashing towards building the bomb. So, this threat is very, very serious and needs to be dealt with from the Western capitals immediately.

Thank you. Any other questions? Let's go there first and then back here, and then go there.

Q: Houssaine Taud from Al Arabiya News Channel. I have two questions. The first one is, do you have any ideas regarding how Houthis, after they have received these arms in the middle of the sea, how do they go back to their ports? Because we know their ports are monitored by the Arab Coalition and even by the U.S. Army there. How do they go back to their ports? Second, what are the nationalities of these African mercenaries? Are they from the Horn of Africa, because Iran is trying to control that strait?

ALIREZA JAFARZADEH: Well, in terms of getting the weapons, the Iranian regime actually helps them both in terms of monitoring, providing GPS coordinates. As I gave you one example, they had to have the Houthis wait for several days before the pathway was cleared. They are camouflaging things so they wouldn't look like a ship carrying weapons. Even though a lot of them have been confiscated, but a lot of them have not been confiscated. That's how they already have those weapons in their hands, and are attacking with those. I gave you examples-- at least seven or eight examples since summer of this year. So, that's as far as the first part of your question.

Now, what was the second part of your question? Right. The African nationalities: To the best of our information, Somalia, Djibouti, and some other countries.

Yes, please, let's go there and then we'll come here. Right behind you, right there.

Q4: Thank you so much for all the information you gave us. But what puzzles me is that I'm sure the Biden administration is aware of this, all the matters you just mentioned. And why is it that they're about to sign an agreement with Iran and they're eliminating all these matters and not paying attention? I just want to know, is it because they are preventing war? Is it because they really are unwilling, the Biden administration? Or they have no other choice? What is the reason? And what can be done?

ALIREZA JAFARZADEH: Okay, thank you so much. Well, I think we've been very clear that in terms of the Biden administration. I think the best answer for that is, Senator Bob Menendez last night delivered a one-hour speech on the floor of the Senate. Everyone knows him, he's the powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He comes from the same party, the administration's party. And he heavily criticized the way the whole issue of negotiations has been handled by the administration. Basically just moving the goal rapidly. There's no clear red line. And he said that there was supposed to be a longer and stronger agreement, that's nowhere to be found. And he called for a sharp turnaround of approach and policy regarding Iran. And I think you will hear a lot of other, stronger voices from within the Democratic party in addition to the Republicans. And I think it's now time for everyone to rethink everything, have a totally different look at the situation in Iran and the fact that this regime is not about the negotiations. No negotiations would be good negotiations if it allows the Iran regime to get closer to the bomb, threaten its own neighbors in the region, killing more of its own people inside the country. There has been a rise in the number of executions in Iran ever since the negotiations started earlier last year.

So you have questions from remote journalists?

Q: We have some journalists attending the event remotely. We have Mr. Oubai Shahbandar from Arab News posing a question. The question is: Are these naval smuggling routes used to move missile components to the Houthis from Iran? The second question: Can you tell us more about the Iraqi militia proxies that are involved in Quds Force naval activities?

ALIREZA JAFARZADEH: In response to Mr. Oubai Shahbandar's question from Arab News, yes, the missile parts have been provided to the Houthis. The significant amount of technology, parts, equipment, related to the missile program has been provided by the Iranian regime. In fact, there would be no Houthi missile program at all if it weren't for the Iranian regime. Everything in terms of training, technology, equipment, parts, everything comes from the Iranian regime. It doesn't make any difference if they paint the missiles to have a different name, or the drones, allocate it a different name. It's those missiles, those drones are the ones produced and provided by the Iranian regime to serve the purpose of the regime in the region.

The Iranian regime unfortunately has been using the conflict in the region. They tried to derail the democratic aspirations of the people of Yemen after the Arab Spring. Like many other countries, they stood up. But at the end of the day, who stole the whole thing and who derailed it? It was Ansarullah, the Houthis, who were actually created and trained in Qum by the Revolutionary Guards many, many years ago and developed into an entity, as destructive an entity as we see today.

Now in terms of the Iraqi militias, absolutely all of the training by the Iraqi militias is done by the Iranian regime. A number of Iraqi nationals were dispatched to Iran and trained. And as mentioned, actually they're trained in Ziba Kenar, and they were sent back to Al-Faw and Basra.

So, those are the main locations for these militia groups that operate. And their aim is again targeting ships or carrying out any kind of agenda that the Iranian regime has had. The same way that Tehran has been providing assistance and training and arming the Shia militias on the ground in carrying out terror operations in the past almost two decades, the same way they're doing it with their maritime activities in Iraq.

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